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Abstract 
We exploit detailed data on approved and rejected small business loans to assess the impact 
of the introduction of a credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our findings are threefold. 
First, mandatory information sharing tightens lending at the extensive margin as more 
applications are rejected, in particular in areas with strong credit market competition. These 
rejections are increasingly based on hard information—especially positive borrower 
information from the new registry—and less on soft information. Second, lending standards 
also tighten at the intensive margin: the registry leads to smaller, shorter and more expensive 
loans. Third, the tightening of lending along both margins improves loan quality. Default 
rates go down in particular in high competition areas and for first-time borrowers. This 
suggests that a reduction in adverse selection is an important channel through which 
information sharing affects loan quality. 
JEL codes: D04, D82, G21, G28 
Keywords: Information sharing, credit market competition, hazard models 
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Agency problems in banking remain rife, especially in emerging markets where information 
asymmetries tend to be high, screening and monitoring costly and creditor rights weak. 
Finding novel ways to overcome these frictions is of first-order importance as lenders 
typically cannot apply risk-mitigation techniques—such as collateral (Bester, 1987) or 
contingency contracts (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990)—that have been tried and tested in 
more benign lending environments. As a result, many borrowers continue to be credit 
rationed or charged high interest rates. 
Various countries have recently introduced public credit registries in an attempt to 
improve the functioning of credit markets by requiring lenders to share borrower information. 
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such registries, in terms of greater access to 
credit and improved loan quality, remains limited and is mainly based on cross-country 
comparisons. This paper presents more direct evidence of what happens when lenders in a 
competitive credit market start to share borrower information. We focus on the introduction 
of a credit registry in which all lenders are required to participate. Evaluating the impact of 
such a regime change is challenging for at least two reasons. First, borrower information is 
typically only publicly available after a registry is introduced. Second, even if pre-registry 
data exist it remains difficult to identify the impact of information sharing if all banks and 
borrowers are similarly affected by the new regime. 
To surmount these challenges, we use a unique contract-level data set consisting of the 
complete loan portfolio of a large lender in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two features make our 
data particularly well suited to study the question at hand. First, we can exploit detailed 
information on the terms—amount, maturity, interest rate, collateral and performance—of all 
small-business loans that this lender granted through its branch network. Importantly, we 
have data from before and after the introduction of the credit registry and hence observe 
lending decisions by the same loan officers under different information-sharing regimes. 
Second, we also have information on all loan applications that this lender rejected and we 
know why they were rejected. We again have these data for the period before and after the 
introduction of the registry. 
What makes our data even more valuable is the local context. Credit-market competition 
varies significantly across Bosnia and Herzegovina and we capture this variation through an 
objective competition measure (the number of local lenders) and a subjective measure based 
on loan officers’ own perceptions. Based on existing theoretical work, we expect the impact 
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of the credit registry to be stronger in geographical areas with more intense credit market 
competition. We therefore use a difference-in-differences framework to exploit the time 
variation in information sharing, cross-regional variation in competition, and cross-borrower 
variation in lending history. This strategy allows us to identify the impact of mandatory 
information sharing on rejection rates, lending conditions and loan quality. 
We find that information sharing tightens lending at the extensive margin as more 
applications are rejected, in particular in competitive areas. These rejections are increasingly 
based on hard information—especially positive borrower information from the new registry. 
In contrast, the probability that a loan gets rejected due to soft information declines. Lending 
standards also tighten at the intensive margin: first-time borrowers receive smaller, shorter 
and dearer loans for which they have to put up more collateral. Interestingly, with the registry 
in place repeat borrowers can now signal their quality to competing lenders. This forces the 
incumbent lender to offer better terms to repeat borrowers: they receive progressively larger, 
longer and cheaper loans. Lastly, the tightening of lending standards also results in higher 
loan quality, in particular in high-competition areas and for first-time borrowers. This 
suggests that a reduction in adverse selection is an important channel through which 
information sharing affects loan quality. Various robustness and placebo tests confirm that 
the impacts we identify reflect the actual introduction of the credit registry and the associated 
sudden improvement in information sharing and not differences in economic conditions 
between branches, secular trends or model specification. 
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on the mandatory sharing of ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ information in credit markets. Negative information refers to data on borrower 
defaults and arrears. Sharing this information helps lenders avoid low-quality borrowers and 
in turn incentivizes borrowers to stay off the blacklist. Positive information includes data on 
applicants’ outstanding loans and guarantees as well as their credit history (other than 
defaults and arrears). When lenders share positive information borrowers can gradually build 
up a valuable reputation as trustworthy borrowers. 
Various theoretical contributions have explored how sharing these two types of 
information can alleviate moral hazard, adverse selection and over-borrowing. First, moral 
hazard may decline as borrowers no longer fear that their bank will extract rents from them 
by exploiting proprietary information (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). Hold-up problems due to 
informational lock-in (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; von Thadden, 2004) diminish in particular 
for repeat borrowers. With a registry in place, defaulting borrowers also lose their reputation 
in the whole credit market and not just with their current lender (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1997). 
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This further reduces moral hazard, in particular if banks only exchange negative information 
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Theory suggests that both mechanisms increase borrower 
discipline, improve loan quality and lead to more lending at lower interest rates. 
Second, the availability of centralized credit data can reduce adverse selection and bring 
safe borrowers back into the market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993).1 While such improved 
screening boosts loan quality, the effect on the quantity of lending is ambiguous as more 
lending to safe borrowers may be offset by less lending to riskier clients. 
Third, a credit registry can also prevent borrowers from taking loans from multiple banks 
(“double dipping”) instead of applying for one single loan. 2  When borrowers can hide 
outstanding debt, each loan will be under-priced as new lenders ignore that their loan 
increases the default risk of existing debt. Sharing (positive) information about borrowers’ 
other loans rules out such negative externalities and makes lenders more careful.3 This may 
lead to fewer, smaller and more expensive loans with a better repayment record. 
To sum up, the extant theoretical literature predicts an unambiguous positive effect of 
information sharing on loan quality while the impact on the quantity of lending is less clear-
cut. Models that stress initial over-indebtedness predict a decline in lending, theories that 
focus on moral hazard suggest that lending increases and the effect of reduced adverse 
selection remains theoretically ambiguous. 
Importantly, all these contributions suggest a stronger impact of information sharing in 
more competitive credit markets. When competition is high, moral hazard may be more 
salient because defaulting borrowers can easily move to another lender. Lender competition 
can also exacerbate adverse selection as investments in information acquisition fall 
(Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) and banks reallocate credit to captured borrowers of lower 
quality (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Over-borrowing is more likely to occur in high-
competition markets too (Parlour and Rajan, 2001). For these reasons, the introduction of 
mandatory information sharing can be expected to ‘bite’ most in competitive credit markets.4 
                                                          
1 The effect may be even stronger when the sharing of hard borrower information encourages banks to invest 
more in soft, non-verifiable information to gain a competitive advantage (Karapetyan and Stacescu, 2014a). 
2 See Hoff and Stiglitz (1997), McIntosh and Wydick (2005) and Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo (2015) for 
theory and McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) for evidence from a Ugandan microfinance institution. 
3 Degryse, Ioannidou and von Schedvin (2012) use data from a Swedish bank to show that when a previously 
exclusive firm obtains a loan from another bank, the firm’s initial bank decreases its internal limit, suggesting 
that information sharing allows lenders to condition their terms on loans from others. Cheng and Degryse (2010) 
provide similar evidence for the Chinese credit card market. 
4 This is also because voluntary information sharing is unlikely to emerge in competitive markets. See Pagano 




On the empirical side, cross-country evidence suggests that information sharing is 
associated with less risk taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 
2012), more lending to the private sector, less defaults and lower interest rates (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 1993; 2002). These effects appear to be stronger in developing countries (Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007) and for opaque firms (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009). 
However, cross-country studies only imperfectly control for confounding factors that might 
lead to a spurious correlation between information sharing and credit outcomes. They 
typically also do not analyze the mechanisms through which mandatory information sharing 
affects credit markets. 
A small literature has therefore started to exploit contract-level information on the 
introduction of new credit registries, or changes in the coverage of existing registries, to more 
cleanly identify the impact of mandatory information sharing. Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick 
(2007) and de Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet (2010) analyze the staggered use of a registry 
by the branches of a Guatemalan microfinance institution. They find an increase in loan 
performance, especially for borrowers that are aware of the existence of the registry. Doblas-
Madrid and Minetti (2013) focus on the staggered entry of lenders into a credit registry for 
the U.S. equipment-financing industry. Entry improved repayment for opaque firms but 
reduced loan size. In a similar vein, Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2011) show how 
lowering the reporting threshold of the Argentinean credit registry resulted in less lending to 
firms with multiple lending relationships due to improved lender coordination. Lastly, 
González-Uribe and Osorio (2014) explore the impact of erasing negative borrower 
information from a Columbian credit bureau. Wiping out this information allowed borrowers 
to attract larger and longer loans from new lenders. Yet, the quality of these new loans was 
significantly lower than those of similar borrowers whose credit history had not been reset.5 
We contribute to this recent literature in at least two important ways. First, we use 
detailed information about local variation in lender competition as a source of identification. 
This allows us to test for the first time the theoretical prediction that mandatory information 
sharing is particularly beneficial in more competitive credit markets. Second, we have access 
to unique data on why individual loan applications were rejected before and after the 
introduction of the registry. We observe directly to what extent lenders use negative and 
positive borrower information when both types of information become publicly available. 
While this approach has clear strengths, it has some drawbacks as well. Our analysis is based 
                                                          
5 In a similar vein, Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find that Bolivian firms switch banks once information about 
prior defaults is erased and their incumbent lender no longer holds them up. 
5 
 
on data from a single large bank in one particular country. While this may somewhat limit the 
external validity of our findings, we note that both the Bosnian market for small business 
loans and the credit registry we study are very similar to those in many other countries. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides background on our empirical setting, after 
which Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and identification strategy, respectively. Section 5 
then presents our empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical setting 
2.1.  Small business lending in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from the 1992-1995 Yugoslav civil war with a badly 
damaged industrial infrastructure but a highly educated and entrepreneurial middle class 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Panos, 2010). To start a new business many entrepreneurs 
borrowed from a growing number of banks and microfinance institutions. When Bosnia and 
Herzegovina implemented its public credit registry in 2009, 17 banks and 12 microfinance 
institutions operated across the country. This competitive financial sector led to an expansion 
of domestic credit from 23.4 percent of GDP in 2001 to 67.7 percent of GDP in 2013.6 An 
increasing number of small entrepreneurs took out several loans at the same time (Maurer and 
Pytkowska, 2011) and many loans were collateralized through personal guarantees by friends 
or family members. A registry for pledged movable assets only became operational in 2006. 
There exists strong regional variation across Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
competitiveness of the local market for small-business loans. For instance, in the city of 
Mostar a total of 23 branches of 12 different financial institutions provide small-business 
loans, whereas in Zivinice—a city of roughly similar population size—only 6 lenders operate 
8 branches. This strong variation makes Bosnia and Herzegovina an interesting setting to 
study the interaction of mandatory information sharing and lender competition. 
 
2.2.  Information sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
While a private data-collection agency had been active in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
2000, most banks and microfinance institutions neither used it nor contributed information to 
it. Participation was voluntary and expensive and hence coverage was incomplete and 
ineffective. Lenders could therefore not check whether loan applicants had already borrowed 
                                                          
6 Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina). 
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from one or more competitors. As one manager of a large Bosnian financial institution 
succinctly put it: “Before the introduction of the credit registry, we were basically blind.” 
Loan officers of competing lenders even actively disseminated false information about their 
borrowers. This suggests, in line with experimental evidence7 , that coordination failures 
prevented the emergence of any voluntary information sharing among lenders. 
In response to this institutional deficiency, the Bosnian central bank started to set up a 
public credit registry (Centralni Registrar Kredita, CRK) in 2006. Yet, it was only in July 
2009 that participation became mandatory for all formal lenders, including microfinance 
institutions. This is also the month in which EKI, the Bosnian lender whose loan portfolio we 
analyze, started to provide information to the registry and began to use it. Stakeholder 
interviews suggest that the July 2009 registry introduction marked a sudden improvement in 
the available information about prospective borrowers. No other financial regulations were 
introduced in the second half of 2009. 
The Bosnian credit registry requires lenders to submit a report every time a loan to a firm 
or private individual is disbursed, repaid in full, late, or written off. The registry contains both 
negative information on past loan defaults and positive information on any other loans that a 
loan applicant has still outstanding. The registry also includes information on whether the 
borrower has a guarantor or is a guarantor herself. Each borrower receives a credit score 
based on his or her current debt as well as past repayment performance. Information is 
comprehensive and dependable as the central bank checks its quality and consistency. 
Banks are required to include a clause in each loan contract in which the borrower agrees 
to a credit check via the registry. Borrowers are therefore aware that their repayment 
performance will be recorded and shared with other banks. While submitting information to 
the registry is mandatory, checking the data is voluntary and subject to a small fee of BAM 
0.15 (USD 0.12). The registry receives on average about 240,000 requests a month. 
 
2.3.  The lender 
We use data from EKI, one of the main providers of individual-liability micro and small-
business loans in Bosnia. Founded in 1996, EKI lends through a network of 15 branches to 
around 34,000 borrowers across both parts of the country (the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Borrowers are typically small firms that are 
                                                          
7 Ibid. footnote 4. 
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relatively opaque as they are not monitored by the press or rating agencies and in most cases 
do not have audited accounts. 
EKI loan officers act as sales agents who collect all loan-applicant information, including 
from the credit registry, that is needed to make an initial lending decision. Loan officers fill 
out an electronic site-visit form with information on the borrower, his or her credit history 
and available collateral. These initial lending decisions are then discussed during a meeting of 
the branch-level loan committee on the basis of which the loan application is approved or 
rejected. Each branch employs on average 14 loan officers at any point in time. 
 
3. Data 
3.1.  Loan applications and granted loans 
We have access to all loan applications received by EKI during the period January 2007-
December 2012 and all loans granted during June 2002-December 2012. Figure A1 in the 
Appendix summarizes the loan applications (panel A) and approved loans (panel B) for the 
overlapping period January 2007-December 2012.8 We also show the distribution of loans 
and applications across branches in high versus low competition areas and, for approved 
loans, across new versus existing borrowers. For the loan applications, we know the age and 
gender of the applicant as well as the loan amount, loan purpose and term requested. Table 1 
(panel A) shows that the median loan applicant was 41 years old and asked for a two-year 
loan of BAM 3,000 (USD 2,160). About 60 percent of the applicants were male. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The raw data show that the rejection rate almost doubled, from 8 to 15 percent, after the 
introduction of the credit registry (the remainder of the loan applications was approved or, in 
a few cases, withdrawn by the applicant). A unique feature of our data is that we know 
exactly why each loan was rejected, as loan officers are required to enter the main motivation 
for rejecting a loan into the management information system. We split the various rejection 
reasons into those based on hard versus soft information or, alternatively, into those based on 
external versus internal information. Rejections based on hard information are those where 
loan applicants were dismissed because of their age, a low credit score (negative registry 
                                                          
8 Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide the exact variable definitions and data sources. 
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information), too much outstanding debt elsewhere (positive registry information), a bad 
credit history with EKI itself, weak financials or insufficient collateral. Rejections based on 
soft information are those where the loan officer had doubts about the applicant’s character, 
received a bad recommendation from someone else, or where the loan purpose was unclear. 
Rejections due to internal information are based on information that EKI collected itself, 
either in the past of during the current screening. This includes information on the financial 
ratios of the borrower, the purpose of the loan, the character of the borrower, and the 
available collateral. Rejections due to external information are those based on (‘positive’) 
information about applicants’ outstanding debt elsewhere or (‘negative’) information about 
previous repayment problems. Both types of information became easily available with the 
introduction of the credit registry while they were generally unavailable before (as voluntary 
exchange of borrower information among lenders was virtually absent). 
Panel A of Table 1 shows a clear shift in the rejection reasons once the credit registry is 
introduced: more (less) loans are rejected due to hard (soft) information. Loan officers start to 
rely more on external information, in particular positive information about outstanding loans 
elsewhere. This indicates that mandatory information sharing led to a significant change in 
loan officer behavior. 
For the more than 200,000 loans approved between June 2002 and December 2012, we 
have detailed contract-level information on their size, maturity, interest rate, collateral and 
purpose. We also have precise information on whether and when there was a late repayment, 
whether the loan was written off and, if so, how much principal and interest was recovered. 
We also know borrowers’ income, education, gender, employment status and family size. 
Overall, we observe the complete borrowing history of over 130,000 unique borrowers and 
can therefore distinguish between new and returning borrowers. Lastly, we know the identity 
of the 458 different loan officers that granted loans in our dataset. The average loan officer 
approved 21 (18) loans per month before (after) the introduction of the credit registry.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the median granted loan amount equals the median 
requested amount and is 2.5 times the average monthly household income of borrowers. The 
median maturity of granted loans (19 months) is below the median requested maturity (24 
months). The annual nominal interest rate was 19 per cent.9 Borrowers use the loans mainly 
for business purposes, with about half of all loans used to buy movable assets such as 
                                                          




equipment and vehicles. A vast majority of loans is collateralized, typically by some form of 
personal collateral and/or one or several guarantors. 
Our measure of loan quality is a dummy equal to “1” if loan repayment was at least once 
more than 30 days late. Of these late loans 97 percent end up in default and are subsequently 
written off. Before the introduction of the registry, 5.9 percent of all loans defaulted. This 
percentage went down to 1.7 percent once the registry was in place. For each non-performing 
loan we know when repayment problems started and we use this dynamic information in our 
hazard analysis (see Section 4). 
 
3.2.  Local credit-market competition 
As will become clear in the next section, our identification strategy is predicated on the prior 
that mandatory information sharing has a stronger impact in competitive credit markets. We 
construct both an objective and a subjective proxy for the intensity of lender competition in 
each of the 15 localities where EKI operates. First, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) where we express a lender’s market share as the number of branches it operates 
in a locality. To do so we collect time-varying data on the distribution of branches across 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from various sources. We first conduct a survey where we ask loan 
officers of each branch to list their local competitors and cross-check this information with 
branch information from www.mixmarket.org, the 2nd EBRD Banking Environment and 
Performance Survey (BEPS II) and lenders’ annual reports. We then calculate an annual 
competition measure equal to 1-HHIbt where b indicates the branch and t the year.
10 
Our second measure of local lender competition is based on loan officers’ subjective 
perceptions. We use information from the aforementioned survey where loan officers in each 
branch were asked how much they agreed, on a scale from one to seven, with the following 
statement: “In the last ten years, there has been an increase in competitive pressure in my 
area of operation.” This competition measure is time invariant, averaged by branch and 





                                                          
10  HHIbt = ∑ sbti
2N
i=1  where sbti
2 = Number branchesbti/Total branchesbt  is the market share in terms of 
branches for lender i and N is the total number of lenders. 
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4. Identification and empirical methodology 
4.1.  Impact on the extensive and intensive lending margins 
We exploit our detailed data to identify the effects of mandatory information sharing on the 
extensive and intensive lending margins and the subsequent performance of approved loans. 
In the first part of our analysis we apply a difference-in-differences framework to a dataset 
that spans the year before and the year after the introduction of the credit registry. We then 
analyze how the introduction affected lending outcomes differently depending on whether 
areas were more or less affected by mandatory information sharing. We regard loan 
applications and approved loans in high-competition areas as the affected or treated group 
and those in low-competition areas as the control group. For both the objective and the 
subjective competition measure we construct a dummy equal to one (zero) for areas with 
above (below) median competition levels. 
A key identifying assumption of this diff-in-diff framework is that outcome variables 
would have developed similarly in the treatment and control group in case no credit registry 
had been introduced. More precisely, we assume that outcomes in both groups had followed a 
parallel path even if there were (time-invariant) level differences. Any trend differences that 
appear once mandatory information sharing is introduced can then be attributed to the 
registry. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows trends, conditional on borrower and loan 
characteristics, for four key outcome variables in the low versus high competition areas 
around the July 2009 introduction of information sharing. In panels A and B, we observe that 
average loan amounts and terms developed very similarly in high vs. low-competition areas. 
However, once information sharing is in place there is a sharp drop in loan size and maturity 
in both types of areas. Moreover, in the same month there is a sudden and sharp jump in the 
interest rate charged as well as the required collateral (panels C and D). We test more 
formally for parallel trends in Section 5 by running the baseline regression for a number of 
fictitious placebo events. Moreover, we show that our results are robust to controlling for any 
diverging trends between high and low competition areas in our regression framework. 
We first apply our diff-in-diff framework to measure the impact of information sharing on 
the extensive margin—the probability that loan applications get approved or rejected—and 
then on the intensive margin (loan amount, term, interest rate and collateral). To this end we 
analyze a pooled dataset consisting of all loan applications and all approved loans in the year 
before and the year after the introduction of the credit registry. We then explain the 
probability of rejection by a Credit registry dummy that identifies applications and loans after 
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the introduction of the registry, a Competition variable that identifies the high-competition 
areas and the interaction between the two. Competition is a dummy variable that is one if 
local credit market competition is above the median level of competition as measured by 1 
minus the HHI index. Our baseline pooled OLS regression model is therefore: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑏 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑏𝑡 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑏𝑡 (1) 
 
Where Yibt is one of our outcome variables for loan or loan application i in branch b in 
month t; Infot is a dummy variable that is ‘one’ for all observations in July 2009 and later, i.e. 
the period when the credit registry was in place; Compb is a dummy variable that is one for all 
loans and loan applications in high-competition branches; Ibt is an interaction term between 
Infot and Compb; Xibt is a matrix of control variables and εibt is the error term. We cluster the 
standard errors conservatively at the individual loan officer level. Results remain 
quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged when we do not cluster or cluster by branch. 
Our standard battery of covariates Xibt includes loan-level control variables, such as 
dummies for various loan types, key borrower characteristics (such as age and gender) and a 
proxy for local economic activity. Since reliable conventional measures of local economic 
activity across Bosnia and Herzegovina do not exist, we use local night light data from 2003 
to 2010 as proposed by Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2011). 
Our main parameter of interest is β: the additional impact of mandatory information 
sharing on loan outcomes in high-competition areas. Based on the prior that mandatory 
information sharing has a larger impact in more competitive credit markets, the interaction 
between the credit-registry dummy and the measure of local competition should be positive. 
To identify this interaction coefficient more cleanly, we also estimate: 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝐴𝑏 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑏𝑡 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑏𝑡 (2) 
 
Here Ab and Bt are branch and month fixed effects, respectively. An advantage of this 
specification is that we can control for omitted local variables through branch-level effects 
and for economy-wide shocks through month fixed effects. If information sharing matters 
more in high-competition branches, even after controlling for branch fixed effects, this is 
strong evidence that our results are not driven by omitted regional variables. 
We also estimate this fixed-effects model with a separate time trend timet for high and 
low competition areas. This allows us to control for possibly diverging trends in outcomes 
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prior to the registry introduction (in violation of the parallel trends assumption discussed 
before). Equation (3) in effect provides an in-model correction, under the assumption that the 
trends are linear, for the case where the parallel trends assumption may not be fully satisfied 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009): 
 
 𝑌𝑖𝑏𝑡 = 𝐴𝑏 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼𝑏𝑡 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑏 + 𝑖𝑏𝑡 (3) 
 
In order to obtain unbiased estimates in our diff-in-diff setting, we need to ensure that we 
can attribute impacts to information sharing and not to differences between borrower groups 
due to non-random assignment across areas with different levels of lender competition. We 
therefore present a variant of Equation (1) where we use propensity score matching based on 
borrower and loan characteristics to assure that borrowers in high (treatment) and low 
(control) competition areas are comparable. By matching borrower and loan characteristics 
we also circumvent the issue of jointness of loan terms (Brick and Palia, 2007). Lastly, the 
introduction of mandatory information sharing may also have shifted the composition of the 
borrower pool. For that reason we need to make sure that we compare similar borrowers 
before and after the registry introduction. We therefore also undertake propensity score 
matching where we control for longitudinal changes in the applicant or borrower pool. 
We match loans based on all available loan, borrower and local characteristics and 
calculate the propensity scores with nearest neighbor matching with replacement. There is 
very large common support with only less than 1 percent of observations outside the support 
area. We then use the propensity scores as weights in a linear regression model where we 
exclude any variable that might be jointly determined with our dependent variables. We apply 
a double-robust estimator (Robins, 2000) since this yields unbiased estimates of the average 
treatment effect when either the propensity score matching model or the linear regression 
model is correctly specified. 
 
4.2.  Impact on loan quality 
In the second part of our analysis, we wish to identify the impact of mandatory information 
sharing on repayment performance and loan quality. We especially want to investigate the 
impact of the credit registry in high-competition markets and for new borrowers. We do so by 
using a hazard model, where the hazard rate is defined as the probability of a borrower being 
late on her repayment at time t conditional on the fact that she repaid regularly up to that 
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point. Hazard functions allow us to model not only whether a loan is going to default but also 
how the probability of default changes over time. This is particularly important as the 
underlying reasons to default might change over the life of the loan (i.e. strategic default).11 
The time between disbursement and the first instance of late (>30 days) repayment is our 
variable of interest when estimating the hazard rate. We do not use the write-off date as our 
default indicator because its timing depends more on the bank's discretion than on the 
borrower's default date. The hazard model allows us to compare the development of the 
hazard rates before and after the introduction of mandatory information sharing and for first-
time as well as repeat EKI borrowers. If mandatory information sharing indeed results in a 
better allocation of credit, then we expect a large drop in the hazard rate after the registry 
information and in particular in high-competition branches. 
Aside from their economically intuitive interpretation, the main advantage of hazard 
models is their ability to deal with censoring. Censoring occurs when the loan is repaid or 
when the life of the loan extends beyond the sample period (right censoring). Given that most 
loans are repaid successfully, the effects of censoring in estimating the default probability 
will be particularly severe and not correcting for it will yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates in static probability models (Ongena and Smith, 2001). However, a semi-parametric 
model (Cox and Lewis, 1966; Cox, 1972), which makes no assumption about the form of the 
hazard function, is able to deal with right censoring as the log-likelihood function takes into 
account the ratio of completed vs. non-completed loans. Left censoring can cause biased 
estimates as well, but it is not an issue in our case as we only observe new loans. 
To estimate the baseline hazard, let T measure the amount of time (the ‘spell’) before the 
first late repayment of the loan (the ‘switch’). The hazard function can be used to describe the 
distribution of T and is defined as: 
 
 ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
{




The hazard function h(t) is the probability of repayment on a loan being late in time t 
conditional on regular repayments until then. Alternatively we can model the distribution of 
time until first late repayment as its survivor function: 
 
                                                          
11 See also Ongena and Smith (2001), Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2014) and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and 
Saurina (2014) for recent applications of duration analysis in the empirical banking literature. 
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 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) (5) 
 







Using the non-parametric Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator we will plot the survival 
function for different groups of loans. This estimator is easily adjustable for right censoring. 
Following Cox (1972), we estimate the effect of a set of potentially time-varying 
covariates Xt and the distributions of time to default with the proportional hazard model: 
 
 ℎ(𝑡) = lim
∆𝑡→0
{





where h0 represents the baseline hazard when all covariates are set to zero: X=0. Covariates 
shift the baseline hazard without affecting the underlying shape of the hazard function. The 
hazard rate for each individual with characteristics Xt is thus proportional to h0. The partial 
effect of Xt on the log of the covariates hazard rate is represented by the estimated β 
coefficients. In the Cox (1972) semi-parametric approach the functional form of h0 is not 
specified and the model uses the ranking of duration times to estimate the β parameters via 
maximum likelihood methods. 
The Cox proportional hazard model relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes 
continuous time, as the presence of tied events in discrete time would make ranking 
impossible. Since late repayments are only observed at intervals, we deal with tied events 
with the approximation by Breslow (1974). Second, it assumes proportionality, which implies 
time fixed β coefficients. We relax this assumption by estimating a model where the effect of 
covariates Xt can change over the life of the loan. 
We will check the robustness of our results to the functional form of the hazard rate by 
estimating two parametric specifications using the exponential and the Weibull distribution. 
The exponential distribution is easy to interpret and characterized by a constant hazard rate as 
the probability of late repayment is constant over time (Kiefer, 1988). The exponential 
distribution is a special case of the Weibull distribution when α is equal to 1. The Weibull 
distribution is expressed as: 
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 ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ𝛼𝑡𝛼−1 (8) 
 
The coefficient α is particularly interesting as it measures duration dependence. If α>1 the 
hazard rate increases with time (positive duration dependence), giving us an indication of the 
shape of the baseline hazard which is unobserved in the Cox specification. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Information sharing and loan rejections 
Table 2 provides estimation results, based on our difference-in-differences framework, to 
explain the probability that a loan application was rejected. In addition to the variables Credit 
registry, Competition and their interaction term, all specifications include our standard 
applicant and loan covariates. Columns 1 and 2 show the baseline specification, estimated 
with a logit and linear probability model, respectively. We provide the logit model as a 
benchmark but focus primarily on the linear model so that we can estimate the model using 
both time and fixed effects. An added advantage is that we can directly interpret the 
coefficients as marginal effects. A possible disadvantage of linear probability models is that 
fitted values might fall outside the 0,1 bounds. However, in our case more than 99 percent of 
the linear predictions have a value that lies between zero and one. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
We find that the introduction of the credit registry is associated with a large and statistically 
significant increase in the probability that a loan application gets rejected, all else equal. In 
the logit model in column 1, the marginal probability of rejection is equal to 4.8 percentage 
points and this is consistent with the magnitude of the linear probability effects reported in 
the subsequent columns. These range between 4.8 and 5.2 percentage points and in all cases 
the coefficients are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. 
In order to provide empirical support to our theoretical framework, we should find 
stronger effects of the introduction of the credit registry in high competition areas. This is 
indeed the case as the interaction term of Competition and Credit registry has a positive and 
significant effect in all models. After the introduction of the credit registry, the rejection 
probability is 4 percentage points higher in high than in low competition areas (9 versus 5 
percentage points). In line with the theoretical literature outlined in Section 1, this suggests 
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that mandatory information sharing is especially effective in competitive credit markets. The 
statistical and economic significance of this result survives when we add branch fixed effects 
(column 3), month fixed effects (column 4) or both (column 5). Including separate time 
trends for high and low competition branches (column 6) does not alter the results either. 
We also observe a significantly higher base probability of rejection in high competition 
areas, since the marginal effect is close to 2 percentage points for the probit model and 1.8 
percentage points for the LPMs. These level effects of course disappear once we control for 
the time effect of the credit-registry introduction and for cross-sectional differences in 
competition with time and branch fixed effects in columns 5 and 6. 
The finding that information sharing reduces the probability that a loan application is 
accepted, in particular in competitive areas, suggests that the newly available information 
makes loan officers more conservative. This is in line with theories that stress over-borrowing 
in competitive areas in the absence of information sharing (Parlour and Rajan, 2001). 
In Table A3 in the Appendix we subject the baseline interaction effect between 
Competition and Credit registry, based on the linear probability model, to a number of 
robustness (columns 1-3) and placebo (columns 4-6) tests. In the first three columns, we vary 
the time window over which we estimate the effect of the registry introduction. Our regular 
window is one year before and one year after the introduction. In column 1 we use a shorter 
symmetric window of just one year in total (February 2009-February 2010). In column 2 we 
then use a wider window which comprises the period May 2008-December 2010 while in 
column 3 we use the widest window possible given the available data: January 2007-
December 2012. In all cases the statistical and economic significance of the impact of the 
credit registry in high-competition areas is very similar to our base result in Table 2. 
We provide placebo tests in columns 4 to 6 to carefully check whether our results are not 
driven by any secular trends that hitherto remained undetected. These tests are also a more 
formal way to test for the parallel trends assumption: since at the fictitious dates no credit 
registry was introduced, we should not detect any impact. In column 4 we show results for a 
placebo test where we move our two-year window one year forward. This means that we take 
the true treatment period as the control period and then assume that the treatment period only 
starts in July 2010. We basically assume that the credit registry was introduced a year later 
than it really was. In column 5 we show results for a placebo test where we move our two-
year window one year backwards. We now take the true control period as the treatment 
period and assume that the credit registry was already introduced in July 2008, a year earlier 
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than it really was. This placebo test is especially useful because it allows us to test whether 
we are not also picking up any impact of the 2007-09 global financial crisis. 
Finally, in column 6 we randomly allocate branches to either high or low competition 
status. We repeat this random allocation a thousand times and show the average result. The 
treatment period starts in July 2009, the actual date that the credit registry was introduced. In 
all three cases we find that our results disappear. This gives us additional confidence that the 
results in Table 2 are not spurious but indeed reflect a change in lending behavior due to the 
introduction of the credit registry in July 2009. 
In Table 3 we assess which type of information is responsible for the additional 
conservatism among loan officers after the introduction of the registry. We present 
multinomial logit regressions to explain the probability of loan rejection due to the use of 
various types of borrower information. The dependent variable is a categorical one and 
indicates whether a loan application was accepted (which we take as the base probability) or 
rejected on the basis of different types of information. We then estimate the effect of the 
introduction of the credit registry on rejections due to hard versus soft information (columns 
1 and 2) or, in a separate multinomial set-up, due to internal information, negative external 
information or positive external information (columns 3-5). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The results in columns 1 and 2 show, in line with Table 2, that the introduction of mandatory 
information sharing led to a higher rejection probability and that this is especially so in high-
competition areas. We now also observe directly that it is hard information that is responsible 
for this stricter screening by loan officers. In contrast, the probability that a loan gets rejected 
due to soft information goes down after the introduction of the registry, especially in low-
competition areas. Note that there is a positive base effect of lender competition on the 
rejection probability due to hard information (column 1) but not due to soft information 
(column 2). This is in line with theories that stress that lending competition reduces banks 
investments in generating and using soft information (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). 
In columns 3 to 5, we cut the data in a different way and compare rejections due to 
internal versus external information. The latter is split up in positive versus negative 
information, both of which became more easily available due to the registry. We find that 
after the registry introduction loan officers reject more loans on the basis of both internal and 
external information although the impact of external information is much stronger. In 
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particular, column 5 shows a very strong increase in rejections due to positive information 
about applicants’ debt elsewhere and this holds independent of the local competition level. 
The use of negative information (credit scores that contain information about applicants’ past 
defaults) increases too, in particular in high-competition areas where adverse selection 
problems may be most severe. 
 
5.2.  Information sharing and loan conditions 
We proceed by analyzing the change in lending conditions around the credit-registry 
introduction to gauge to what extent loan officers adjusted their lending on the intensive 
margin. The loan characteristics we consider are the Loan amount, Loan term (maturity), 
Interest rate, and Collateral (which is the sum of posted personal, social and third-party 
collateral). In line with our identification strategy, we assess both the direct effect of the 
introduction of the registry as well as its interaction with Competition. 
Table 4 reports the difference-in-differences results. Mandatory information sharing was 
accompanied by a reduction in both loan amounts and maturities and an increase in the 
interest rate charged and collateral required. All of these effects are statistically significant, 
stronger in competitive areas and hold when including our standard set of borrower and other 
covariates. The unreported covariate coefficients show that older, highly educated, higher-
income and rural borrowers receive larger loans at lower interest rates. 
These results also hold when we use propensity score matching to assure that borrowers 
in high (treatment) and low (control) competition areas are comparable (column 3) or when 
we match to correct for possible longitudinal changes in the borrower pool (column 4).12 The 
same holds for adding month and branch fixed effects in column 5, which comes at the cost 
of not being able to estimate the level effects of Credit registry and Competition, and for 
adding separate time trends for high and low competition branches (column 6). Finally, 
column 7 shows that our results do not change when we sort branches by competition level 
based on the subjective rather than the objective Competition measure. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                                          
12 When we compare new borrowers before and after the introduction of the registry along various observable 
characteristics, we do not find that they have changed much. Even where differences are statistically significant, 
they are minor in economics terms. This suggests that EKI did not react to the registry by shifting its lending to 
a different type of borrower. 
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After the introduction of the registry, the loan size drops by 19 percent. In high competition 
areas, the reduction is even more pronounced, averaging 25 percent. The same pattern can be 
found looking at loan maturity, where loans are 13 percent shorter overall (equivalent to 90 
days) and 16.3 percent shorter in high competition areas (almost 120 days). Smaller loans do 
not lead to lower interest rates as they are 0.7 percentage points higher overall and 0.8 
percentage points higher in competitive areas.13  Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) argue that 
information sharing generates a flatter inter-temporal structure of interest rates as banks see 
fewer benefits to establishing long-term lending relationships. In line with our results, their 
model suggests that information sharing increases the interest rates paid by new borrowers.  
In a similar vein, collateralization requirements go up after the introduction of the credit 
registry by 0.68 extra items pledged to each loan, in particular in high-competition areas 
where the number of required collateral items increases by 0.83. The increased reliance on 
collateral is in line with U.S. evidence presented by Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) and 
with theoretical work by Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014b) who show that information 
sharing and collateral may be complements as borrowers with a bad credit history are now 
more likely to face collateral requirements. 14  In all, our results indicate clearly that the 
introduction of the credit registry led loan officers to significantly tighten their lending 
conditions on the intensive margin. 
In Appendix Tables A4 and A5 we report similar robustness and placebo tests as the ones 
we performed for the extensive lending margin. The same covariates as in Table 4 are 
included but not shown for reasons of brevity. We again find that our coefficient of interest is 
remarkably robust to broadening or widening the window around the correct starting date of 
the registry (Table A5). And, as before, our results disappear once we move the start of the 
treatment to a fictitious date one year earlier or one year later (Table A4). In additional 
unreported placebo tests we let the treatment period start in October 2010 for Loan amount, 
September 2006 for Loan term and February 2009 for Interest rate. These placebo start times 
are chosen on the basis of a Clemente-Montañés-Reyes unit-root test, which indicates a 
possible break point in that month for each dependent variable. We also perform a test where 
the placebo treatment starts in September 2008 - the collapse of Lehman Brothers - and ends 
                                                          
13 The positive impact of information sharing on interest rates is independent of whether we control for loan 
amount or not. 
14  This fits with a broader empirical (Roszbach, 2004; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Berger, Scott Frame and 
Ioannidou, 2011) and theoretical (Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991; Inderst and Mueller, 2007) literature that 
highlights that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to be required to pledge collateral. In contrast, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2000) suggest that information sharing may lead lenders to shift from collateral-based 
lending policies to more information-based policies. 
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with the introduction of the registry in July 2009. If we would simply pick up a crisis effect, 
this should show up here. Throughout all these placebo tests, our original results disappear, 
suggesting that we indeed pick up the true registry effect and not another trend or break point 
such as the global financial crisis. 
Table 5 compares the impact of information sharing on first-time versus repeat 
borrowers.15 We estimate the evolution of subsequent loans for borrowers who successfully 
repaid their first loan. Using borrower-fixed effects we show that subsequent loans become 
progressively larger, longer, cheaper and require less collateral. 16  As the lender gathers 
information about the borrower, loan terms are relaxed to reward timely repayment. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
What is particularly interesting though is that this effect becomes stronger for all of the loan 
terms after the introduction of the credit registry. This is reflected in the statistically 
significant coefficients for the interactions between the loan numbers and the Credit registry 
dummies. The implication is that while information sharing results in tighter loan terms for 
first-time borrowers, it improves these terms for repeat borrowers. In the absence of 
information sharing, repeat borrowers that try to switch to a competing lender get pooled with 
low-quality firms and are therefore offered an unattractive interest rate (Sharpe, 1990). With 
information sharing, outside lenders can observe good borrower performance. This reduces 
the market power of the incumbent lender and boosts the bargaining power of reputable 
borrowers (Padilla and Pagano, 1997). This leads to better loan terms over the course of the 
lending relationship, in line with Petersen and Rajan (1995) and the aforementioned 
theoretical work of Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007). 
Interestingly, supplementary (unreported) regressions indicate that the additional increase 
(decrease) in loan amount (interest rate) for repeat borrowers after the introduction of the 
registry was mainly observed in high-competition areas. This suggests that in areas where 
more lenders are present and competition is stronger, information sharing opens up more 
outside options to formerly captive borrowers and, as a result, the impact of information 
sharing on repeat borrowers is higher in such competitive credit markets. 
 
                                                          
15 First-time clients are new to EKI but may have borrowed from other lenders in the past. 
16 The use of client-fixed effects implies that all one-time borrowers drop out of these regressions so that we 
compare first-time and repeat loans among a set of repeat borrowers. 
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5.3.  Information sharing and loan quality: Non-parametric results 
Figure 1 provides a first non-parametric look at our data on loan quality in the form of a 
Kaplan-Meier survival analysis over the period June 2002 to December 2012. The graphs 
show how the probability that a borrower has not (yet) defaulted on her loan changes over 
time (horizontal axis, in quarters). At the time of disbursement (t=0) the probability of 
survival is by definition 1 but then gradually erodes over time. In effect, the graph thus shows 
the inverse of the cumulative default probability. Panel A compares, for the whole sample 
period, the survival probability of borrowers in the branches that face below median 
competition versus those that are confronted with an above median level of competition. The 
key point to take away from this panel is the minimal difference in the survival behavior 
among borrowers in high versus low competition areas. The difference between both curves 
is statistically insignificant as shown by a logrank test (p-value=0.60). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
In panel B, we start to compare the survival behavior of loans granted before and after the 
introduction of the credit registry. In this context, right censoring will affect 
disproportionately the more recent group of loans. The correct hazard rate is then calculated 
as the ratio of loans that have defaulted at time t over the remaining loans (Ongena and 
Smith, 2001). Without correcting for right censoring, the hazard rate would be calculated as 
the ratio of all loans dropping from the dataset over remaining loans. Panel B reveals a 
substantial difference in repayment behavior as loans granted with the credit registry in place 
have a significantly higher survival probability compared to loans approved without 
mandatory information sharing. This is the first piece of evidence we bring to bear that points 
to a positive impact of information sharing on loan quality. 
A striking aspect of panel B is that the difference between both loan types already 
emerges during the first quarters after loan disbursement. Indeed, the probability of a loan not 
being late in the first six months after disbursement increases from 94.6 percentage points 
before the credit registry introduction to 98.6 percentage points afterwards. Over time this 
difference declines but stays statistically and economically significant. 
Panels C and D look at the interaction of mandatory information sharing and local credit 
market competition. Panel C shows that without information sharing repayment rates are 
significantly worse in high competition areas (the p-value of a logrank test is 0.00). However, 
we observe the opposite after the registry introduction (panel D, p-value=0.00). Repayment 
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behavior now becomes even slightly better in high competition areas (and this is what drove 
the lack of an overall difference over the whole sample period in panel A). The difference is 
one (two) percentage points after 12 (24) months and remains significant throughout the 
sample period. This effect is economically meaningful as it amounts to a third of the average 
default rate in the period before mandatory information sharing. 
In Figure 2 we take this analysis one step further and now distinguish between first-time 
borrowers (clients that had never borrowed from EKI) and repeat borrowers. On the one 
hand, we expect the impact of the credit registry to be concentrated among new borrowers as 
the information asymmetry between bank and prospective borrower is largest. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the registry (also) had an impact on borrower behavior, we also expect 
an improvement in repayment behavior among repeat borrowers as these now realize that a 
default will 'cost' them more in terms of foregone future borrowing opportunities. As before, 
we also slice our data by competition level, leading to the four panels in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In panels A and B we first focus on new borrowers. Compared to the two top panels in Figure 
1 there is now a striking difference. The impact of the credit registry introduction is much 
larger for new borrowers, suggesting that the registry mainly 'worked' through the bank side. 
Comparing the low-competition areas (panel A) to the high-competition areas (panel B) we 
see clearly that the difference between both survival functions is widest and most persistent in 
the high-competition areas, exactly as theory would suggest. It is in these highly competitive 
areas, where adverse selection problems are rife, that the registry has the most bite and loan 
officers put the hitherto unavailable borrower information to the best use. In these areas the 
survival probability for new borrowers after 12 months increased from 92.5 to 97.5 percent. 
In panels C and D we present a similar comparison but now for repeat borrowers. 
Independent of the level of competition, we see that the registry introduction is accompanied 
by an upward shift of the survival function: at each point in time repeat borrowers are less 
likely to default, suggesting that mandatory information sharing also increased borrower 
discipline. However, while in both graphs the differences between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
graphs are statistically significant (p-value is 0.00 in both cases), the difference is relatively 
small and declines over time. The main impact of the introduction of the credit registry 




5.4.  Information sharing and loan quality: (Semi-)parametric results 
In Table 6 we proceed by providing semi-parametric and parametric evidence on the impact 
of mandatory information sharing on loan quality. As discussed in Section 4.2, an important 
advantage of hazard models - where the hazard rate is the probability of a borrower 
defaulting at time t conditional on having repaid regularly up to that point - is that they deal 
properly with right censoring. A second advantage is that the specifications in Table 6 allow 
us to control for a battery of borrower and loan covariates. We stratify by branch so that the 
form of the underlying hazard function varies across branches (the coefficients of the 
remaining covariates are assumed to be constant across strata). Hence we do not need to 
assume a particular form of interaction between the stratifying covariates and time. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In columns 1-4 we present the results of a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model 
while columns 5 and 6 show equivalent specifications using a parametric exponential and 
Weibull model, respectively. In the first column we limit our sample to loans to first-time 
borrowers, whereas in the following columns we use all loans and include a First loan 
dummy. We then interact this dummy with Credit registry to test whether the impact of 
mandatory information sharing was larger for first-time borrowers (as Figure 2 suggests). 
The results in the first three rows of Table 6 show that the registry introduction is 
associated with a statistically significant reduction in the hazard rate. Importantly, this effect 
is almost twice as high in high-competition areas, in line with Figure 1 and the literature that 
we discussed before. The second line shows that the level of bank competition as such does 
not have an impact on the hazard rate, analogous to panel C of Figure 1.  
In the lower part of the table we show the estimated coefficients for our control variables. 
These have the expected sign and in most cases display a statistically significant relationship 
with the hazard rate. For instance, we find that older and more educated borrowers pose less 
risk while longer and larger loans tend to have higher repayment risks, all else equal. 
As expected, columns 2-6 show that the interaction term between First loan and the 
Credit registry dummy is significantly negative, indicating that the registry reduced default 
risk in particular for first time borrowers, who are still relatively opaque. The coefficient for 
First loan itself is negative but not significantly different from zero. 
In column 4, we relax the proportionality assumption of the Cox model and allow the 
effect of the covariates to change over the life of the loan. This is accomplished by estimating 
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another set of coefficients that change linearly over time since disbursement (not reported). 
We find that even without a proportionality assumption the model yields practically identical 
estimates. The Weibull model in column 6 produces an Ln(alpha) of -0.645, meaning that the 
hazard rate decreases with time. This indicates that a substantial part of the borrower risk is 
‘front loaded’. Finally, the exponential model in column 5 is a special case of the Weibull 
distribution where alpha is equal to 1. 
In Figure 3 we undertake a further placebo analysis to check that we pick up the 
introduction of the credit registry and not some secular trend. The graph shows the coefficient 
estimates and a 95 percent confidence interval for the interaction term Credit 
registry*Competition as used in column 2 of Table 6. The value at time t shows the 
coefficient when using the actual timing of the registry introduction. The values at t-1, t-2, 
etc. indicate the estimates when introducing the registry 1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc. earlier than 
the real date. This shows that when we artificially bring the registry introduction forward, the 
placebo impact is quickly reduced in size and essentially becomes zero two quarters before 
the actual introduction date. We conclude that our measurement of the impact of the registry 
indeed captures the shift in information-sharing regime and not an ongoing longer-term trend. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
In Appendix Table A7, we provide further evidence on the robustness of these findings by 
estimating similar models while allowing covariates to change over the life of the loan. In 
order to include time-varying covariates we modify the structure of our dataset so that each 
loan has multiple observations equal to the number of periods between disbursement and 
either repayment or default (Singer and Willett, 1993). In this way the hazard rate does not 
only depend on the loan and borrower characteristics at the time of disbursement, but also on 
a set of other variables – including the introduction of the credit registry – that may change 
during the life of the loan. The results in Table A7 are fully in line with those in Table 6: 
default risk is lower once the registry is introduced and this holds in particular in more 
competitive areas and for first-time borrowers. 
Finally, Table A8 shows that our results are also robust to adding additional interaction 
terms between Credit registry and other locality-level covariates. We perform this exercise to 
confirm that our interaction term really picks up local competition and not other locality 
characteristics that might explain why certain localities benefited more from the credit-
registry introduction. We construct these new locality-level variables using the second wave 
25 
 
of the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II), a nationally representative 
household survey administered in 2010. We calculate the mean monthly food spending of 
households in a locality; the percentage of households that owns a computer; the percentage 
of households that has a bank account; the percentage of households that can be classified as 
risk takers based on LiTS II; the percentage of household heads that is employed; the 
percentage of orthodox Christian households; the percentage of unemployment in the canton 
and the cantonal GDP. Overall, there are few significant differences between high and low-
competition localities along these dimensions (Appendix Table A6). 
If the introduction of the credit registry affected lending outcomes more in highly 
competitive areas, then the coefficient of Credit registry*Competition should remain negative 
and significant while the coefficient for the interaction term with each LiTS variable should 
be insignificant. The first line of Table A8 shows that our baseline interaction result is indeed 
robust to the inclusion of these various LiTS-based interaction terms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
A wide variety of countries has recently introduced credit registries—or is in the process of 
doing so. Many emerging markets regard registries that collect, consolidate and distribute 
reliable borrower information as a means to overcome weak creditor protection and 
inadequate bankruptcy laws. Many advanced countries consider new or improved credit 
registries as part of the policy response to the global financial crisis. In Europe, for instance, 
these discussions have focused on efforts to consolidate national credit registry data within a 
European central credit registry (IIF, 2013). 
Are credit registries a useful component of a country’s financial infrastructure? To help 
answer that question we present direct evidence of what happens when lenders are required to 
start sharing borrower information. Our analysis exploits unique data of a large small-
business lender in a middle-income country. We have access to detailed information on the 
terms—amount, maturity, interest rate, collateral and performance—of all approved loans 
and on all rejected loan applications. We also know why loan applications were rejected. 
Using these data, we document how mandatory information sharing makes loan officers 
lend more conservatively at both the extensive and intensive margins. This impact is 
particularly pronounced for first-time borrowers and in more competitive credit markets. Our 
data also reveal that the increased conservatism is mainly due to the availability of positive 
credit-registry information, which provides loan officers with a complete picture of the 
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indebtedness of loan applicants. Loan quality increases considerably and this is especially the 
case in high competition areas. 
At first sight, the increase in rejection rates and associated reduction in lending appears at 
odds with cross-country evidence that shows a positive correlation between information 
sharing and banking sector depth. Our view is that both observations are not inconsistent. In 
particular, our identification strategy exploits data on the change in lending behavior during a 
narrow time window around the change in information-sharing regime. This identification 
allows us to precisely estimate whether and how mandatory information sharing impacts 
lending behavior. In line with comparable loan-level evidence presented by Doblas-Madrid 
and Minetti (2013) we find no immediate loosening of lending standards. Indeed, the short-
term impact is to tighten standards as the newly available information leads to a reassessment 
of borrowers’ total indebtedness. This is also in line with recent theoretical work by Gehrig 
and Stenbacka (2007) who predict that information sharing may reduce lending and increase 
interest rates for first-time borrowers without a credit history. 
In the longer term, however, the improved functioning of the credit market can be 
expected to contribute to credit expansion. Indeed, our data already show how the increased 
transparency in the credit market allows well-behaved repeat borrowers to increase their 
borrowing limits and enjoy better loan conditions. Overall, our findings therefore illustrate 
how mandatory information sharing can help loan officers to make better informed credit 
decisions and to match loan offers more precisely with applicants’ repayment capacity. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics







Obs. Median St. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Extensive margin
Dependent variables:
Loan rejected 0.082 0.147*** 210,044 0 0.322 0 1
Loan rejected: Hard information 0.038 0.123*** 210,044 0 0.277 0 1
Loan rejected: Soft information 0.045 0.023*** 210,044 0 0.180 0 1
Loan rejected: Internal information 0.064 0.058*** 210,044 0 0.234 0 1
Loan rejected: External information (negative) 0.004 0.034*** 210,044 0 0.141 0 1
Loan rejected: External information (positive) 0.014 0.054*** 210,044 0 0.186 0 1
Independent variables:
Loan amount (BAM) 3,814 3,303*** 210,044 3,000 2,746 100 15,000
Loan term 27 24*** 210,044 24 13 1 66
Applicant age 40 42*** 210,044 41 12.33 17 82
Applicant male 0.58 0.61*** 210,044 1 0.49 0 1
Panel B: Intensive margin
Dependent variables:
Loan amount (BAM) 3,564 3,173*** 236,893 3,000 2,802 500 15,000
Loan term 23 23.170 236,893 19 11.365 6 60
Interest rate 18.540 21.210*** 236,893 20.500 3.903 12 26
Collateral 2.301 2.414*** 236,893 2 1.506 0 10
Problem loan 0.059 0.017*** 236,893 0 0.208 0 1
Independent variables:
Competition: 1-HHI 0.807 0.799*** 236,893 0.806 0.068 0.556 0.898
Perceived competition 4.981 5.099*** 234,185 5.5 1.1555 3 6.5
Loan/income ratio 3.186 2.975*** 236,893 2.484 2.332 0.444 11.765
Borrower age 40 42*** 236,893 40 12.094 20 68
Borrower male 0.593 0.612*** 236,893 1 0.490 0 1
Borrower education 1.93 1.95*** 236,893 3 0.392 2 4
Borrower monthly income (BAM) 1,212 1,159*** 236,893 1,031 577 350 3,691
Borrower urban 0.39 0.33*** 236,893 2 0.674 1 3
Stable income 0.863 0.831*** 236,893 1 0.353 0 1
Loan immovable 0.081 0.010*** 236,893 0 0.282 0 1
Loan movable 0.427 0.531*** 236,893 0 0.498 0 1
Loan stock 0.408 0.181*** 236,893 0 0.472 0 1
Loan household 0.071 0.142*** 236,893 0 0.291 0 1
Personal collateral 0.248 0.319*** 236,893 0 0.546 0 2
Social collateral 1.968 1.994 236,893 2 1.021 1 5
Third-party collateral 0.040 0.088 236,893 0 0.308 0 2
Loans/officer 21.42 17.66*** 236,893 20 9.048 2 45
Branch growth (quarterly) 0.058 0.044*** 236,131 0.023 0.265 -0.495 1.241
Notes: Panel A: Sample period is January 2007-December 2012. Panel B: Sample period is June 2002-December 2012.
Asterisks refer to the p-value of a t-test of equality of means and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Table 2. Information sharing and credit market competition: Extensive margin
Dependent variable → Loan rejected
Logit Linear probability model
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Credit registry 0.409∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Competition 0.170∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit registry*Competition 0.236∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
No. of applications 63,891 63,893 63,893 63,893 63,893 63,893
Pseudo R-squared 0.022 0.019 0.036 0.028 0.043 0.043
Applicant covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch fixed effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time trends No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table shows regression results to explain the probability that a loan ap-
plication was rejected. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indi-
cate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. A Hausman test rejected
equivalence of random and fixed effects models. Before credit registry: June 2008-
June 2009. During credit registry: July 2009-July 2010. All specifications include
applicant covariates, loan size and type, and a time-varying night-light measure of
local economic activity. Constant not shown. Competition: Dummy variable that
is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median level of competition as
measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where market shares are measured in number
of branches). Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Table 3. Types of borrower information and the likelihood of loan rejection
Hard vs Soft Information Internal vs External Information
Internal External information
Rejection reason → Hard Soft information Negative Positive
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Credit registry 0.653*** -0.768*** 0.205*** 0.739*** 1.254***
(0.037) (0.086) (0.048) (0.053) (0.105)
High competition 0.222*** 0.029 0.219*** -0.021 0.647***
(0.037) (0.059) (0.043) (0.057) (0.108)
Credit registry*Competition 0.130** 0.814*** 0.235*** 0.285*** -0.041
(0.051) (0.112) (0.065) (0.077) (0.132)
No. of applications 63,893 63,473
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.032
Applicant covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents multinomial logit regressions to explain the probability that a
loan application was rejected due to the use of various types of borrower information. The
base probability is that the application was accepted. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Before
credit registry: June 2008-June 2009. During credit registry: July 2009-July 2010. All
specifications include borrower covariates, loan size and type, and a time-varying night-
light measure of local economic activity. Constant not shown. Competition: Dummy vari-
able that is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median level of competition
as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where market shares are measured in number of
branches). Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Table 4. Information sharing and credit market competition: Intensive margin
(a) Loan amount
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Credit registry -0.185∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.025
(0.019) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027)
Competition -0.039 0.028 -0.037
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Credit registry*Competition -0.146∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
No. of loans 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240
Adjusted R-squared 0.435 0.439 0.443 0.421 0.461 0.461 0.464
(b) Loan term
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Credit registry -0.131∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Competition -0.043∗∗ 0.010 -0.043∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Credit registry*Competition -0.071∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No. of loans 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240
Adjusted R-squared 0.332 0.337 0.339 0.313 0.356 0.356 0.357
(c) Interest rate
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Credit registry 0.685∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ -0.117
(0.061) (0.087) (0.087) (0.076)
Competition 0.025 -0.207∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.073) (0.075) (0.078)
Credit registry*Competition 0.343∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.123) (0.106) (0.115) (0.115) (0.110)
No. of loans 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240 28,240
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.243 0.247 0.202 0.275 0.275 0.275
(d) Collateral
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Credit registry 0.320∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046)
Competition 0.225∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.058) (0.058)
Credit registry*Competition 0.357∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (0.054) (0.050) (0.061)
No. of loans 28,228 28,228 28,228 28,228 28,228 28,228 28,228
Adjusted R-squared 0.372 0.391 0.084 0.102 0.440 0.440 0.130
Month and branch fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Group-specific trend No No No No No Yes Yes
Matching: Competition No No Yes No No No No
Matching: Credit registry No No No Yes No No No
Perceived competition No No No No No No Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions at the loan level to estimate the impact of the introduction of the
credit registry on loan amount (Panel A); loan term (Panel B); interest rate (Panel C) and number of pledged
collateral items (Panel D). Before credit registry: June 2008-June 2009. During credit registry: July 2009-
July 2010. All specifications include a time-varying nigh-light measure of local economic activity. Constant
not shown. Competition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median
level of competition as measured by 1 minus the HHI index where local market shares are measured in
number of branches. Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. Sample contains first-time
EKI borrowers only. Standard errors are robust and clustered by loan officer. ***, **, * correspond to the
1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.
Table 5. Information sharing, credit market competition and repeat lending
Dependent variable → Amount granted Term granted Interest rate Collateral
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Credit registry -0.251∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.077) (0.038)
Credit registry*Competition -0.073∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.008 0.271∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.051) (0.028)
2nd loan 0.345∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ -1.045∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.013) (0.010) (0.049) (0.026)
3rd loan 0.583∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.023) (0.018) (0.081) (0.044)
4th loan 0.774∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ -2.346∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.034) (0.028) (0.118) (0.061)
5th loan 0.953∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ -2.919∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗
(0.045) (0.038) (0.161) (0.081)
6th loan 1.167∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ -3.377∗∗∗ 0.175∗
(0.059) (0.049) (0.215) (0.103)
7th loan 1.316∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ -4.208∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗
(0.079) (0.068) (0.292) (0.130)
2nd loan*Credit registry 0.051∗∗ 0.026 -0.115 -0.494∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.016) (0.076) (0.037)
3rd loan*Credit registry 0.104∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.097) (0.049)
4th loan*Credit registry 0.120∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.564∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.027) (0.117) (0.058)
5th loan*Credit registry 0.138∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.033) (0.146) (0.071)
6th loan*Credit registry 0.066 0.097∗∗ -0.417∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.041) (0.186) (0.088)
7th loan*Credit registry 0.114 0.072 -0.169 -0.666∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.060) (0.263) (0.113)
Branch controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Client fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of loans 81,883 81,883 81,883 81,883
R-squared 0.317 0.303 0.121 0.303
Notes: This table shows client fixed effect regressions to estimate the impact of the introduction of the Bosnian credit
registry and credit history on log of loan amount granted [1]; log of loan term granted [2]; interest rate [3] and total number
of collateral contracts [4] across branches that experience varying degrees of credit market competition. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sample only includes
repeat clients. Before credit registry: June 2008-June 2009. During credit registry: July 2009-July 2010. All specifications
include a time-varying night-light measure of local economic activity and control dummies for product type. Constant
not shown. Local competition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median level of
competition as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where local market shares are measured in number of branches). Table
A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Figure 1. Information sharing, credit market competition and loan qual-
ity: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis
(a) High versus low competition branches (b) Before versus during credit registry
(c) High versus low competition be-
fore credit registry
(d) High versus low competition
during credit registry
Notes: These four graphs show Kaplan-Meier survival estimates over the sample period June
2002-December 2012. Logrank test statistics for differences between the curves:
Panel A: χ2(1) = 0.27 (p-value= 0.60). Panel B: χ2(1) = 1667.53 (p-value= 0.00).
Panel C: χ2(1) = 113.72 (p-value= 0.00); Panel D: χ2(1) = 106.89 (p-value= 0.00).
Figure 2. Information sharing, credit market competition and loan quality
for new vs. repeat borrowers: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis
(a) Low competition, new borrowers (b) High competition, new borrowers
(c) Low competition, repeat borrowers (d) High competition, repeat borrowers
Notes: These four graphs show Kaplan-Meier survival estimates over the sample period June
2002-December 2012. Logrank test statistics for differences between the curves:
Panel A: χ2(1) = 723.77 (p-value= 0.00). Panel B: χ2(1) = 392.57 (p-value= 0.00).
Panel C: χ2(1) = 630.53 (p-value= 0.00). Panel D: χ2(1) = 130.52 (p-value= 0.00).
Table 6. Information sharing, credit market competition and loan quality:
Hazard analysis.
Functional form Cox Exponential Weibull
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Credit registry -0.860*** -0.577*** -0.507*** -0.486*** -0.856*** -0.532***
(0.127) (0.078) (0.091) (0.083) (0.105) (0.080)
Competition -0.230 -0.175 -0.178 -0.188 -0.035 -0.182
(0.169) (0.170) (0.171) (0.186) (0.141) (0.178)
Credit registry*Comp. -0.467*** -0.511*** -0.556*** -0.496*** -0.739*** -0.501***
(0.170) (0.117) (0.126) (0.126) (0.151) (0.121)
Borrower education -0.224*** -0.263*** -0.253*** -0.270*** -0.250*** -0.267***
(0.052) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
Borrower age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Borrower male 0.075** -0.001 -0.008 -0.016 -0.020 -0.009
(0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Urban borrower -0.009 0.025 0.033 0.028 0.048 0.025
(0.046) (0.040) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Stable income -0.135*** -0.044 -0.079 -0.013 0.034 -0.028
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.083) (0.053)
Interest rate 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.040*** -0.002 0.034***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Loan maturity 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.005* 0.028*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Loan/income ratio 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
First loan -0.012 -0.009 -0.057* 0.042 -0.036
(0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.031)
Credit registry*First loan -0.201** -0.230** -0.201** -0.197 -0.198**
(0.096) (0.107) (0.101) (0.144) (0.099)
Ln(Alpha) -0.645***
(0.023)
No. of loans 101,883 185,934 162,746 185,934 185,934 185,934
LiTS controls No No Yes No No No
Branch stratification Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Loan sample First All All All All All
Log-likelihood ratio -45,728 -92,204 -102,917 -119,697 -52,650 -49,605
Proportionality Yes Yes Yes No na na
Notes: This table shows the results of Cox proportional hazard models in column [1] to [3], a Cox
non-proportional hazard model in [4], a parametric exponential hazard model in [5] and a parametric
Weibull hazard model in [6]. The dependent variable is the hazard rate, the probability that a loan
i is defaulted on in a given month t given that default did not occur earlier. A default event occurs
when a borrower is at least 30 days late in making a payment and the loan was eventually written off.
Sample period: June 2002-December 2010. We restrict the sample to first-time borrowers in columns
[1]-[3]. Credit registry is a dummy variable that is '1' if the credit registry was in place in a given
month, zero otherwise. Competition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition
is above the median level of competition as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where local market
shares are measured in number of branches). In column [4] we relax the proportionality assumption
and allow time-varying coefficients. All specifications include a time-varying nigh-light measure of
local economic activity and controls for collateral use. Robust standard errors are clustered by loan
officer and appear in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Figure 3. Cox proportional hazard model: Placebo test
Notes: This graph shows the odds ratio estimates (and a 95% confidence interval) for the interaction term
Creditregistry*Competition as used in column 2 of Table 6. The value at t shows the coefficient when
using the actual timing of the credit registry introduction. The values at t− 1, t− 2, etc. show the
coefficient estimates when introducing the credit registry 1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc. earlier than the real
introduction date.
Appendix
Figure A1. Data structure
Panel A
Panel B
Notes: This figure summarizes the data structure for the overlapping sample of loan applications and loan
portfolio (January 2007-December 2012). In the loan performance analysis a longer sample stretching
back to June 2002 is used. Out of the total number of applications, 20,627 were withdrawn by the
borrower before a decision was taken or the loan disbursed.
Table A1. Variable definitions and data sources: Extensive margin
Dependent variables: Definition Source Unit
Loan rejected Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected. EKI Dummy
Loan rejected: Hard
information
Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected because of borrower age,
low credit score in the registry, too many outstanding loans
elsewhere, previous late or non-repayment with EKI, bad financial




Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected because of a bad
recommendation from someone else, because the purpose of the loan
was unclear, or because the loan officer had doubts about certain




Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected because of information that
the lender has in its own systems or has collected itself: information
on financial ratios of the borrower, the purpose of the loan; the





Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected because of a low credit





Dummy=1 if loan application is rejected because of too many
outstanding loans with competing lenders.
EKI Dummy
Independent variables:
Amount requested Requested amount by the loan applicant. EKI BAM
Loan term requested Requested term by the loan applicant. EKI Months
Applicant age Age of the applicant. EKI Years
Applicant male Dummy=1 if applicant male; 0 otherwise. EKI Dummy
Notes: BAM is Bosnian Convertible Marka.
Table A2. Variable definitions and data sources: Intensive margin
Dependent variables: Definition Source Unit
Loan amount Loan amount at time of disbursement. EKI BAM
Loan term Length (tenor) of the loan at time of disbursement. EKI Months
Interest rate Annual nominal interest rate on the loan. EKI %
Collateral Total number of collateral items pledged. EKI Discrete




Credit registry Dummy=1 for all quarters after and including July 2009 (time of




Competition: 1-HHI 1 minus HHI index. The (time-varying) HHI index ranges between
[0, 1] and measures microcredit market concentration in the locality





Competition: Survey Competition intensity as perceived by the two most senior loan
officers in each branch. Average score on a 7-point Likert scale to
the question: Over the past ten years, I think that other microcredit






Loan/income ratio Loan amount at time of disbursement divided by monthly borrower
income. Income includes primary plus secondary income.
EKI Ratio
Borrower age Borrower age. EKI Years
Borrower male Dummy= 1 if borrower is male; 0 otherwise. EKI Dummy
Borrower education 1 = None, 2 = Primary, 3 = Secondary, 4 = Tertiary
(College/University/Post Graduate).
EKI 1 to 4
Borrower income Total annual borrower income (primary plus secondary income
source).
EKI BAM
Urban borrower 0 = Rural; 1 = Urban. EKI Dummy
Stable income 0 = unemployed or casually employed; 1 = stable employment
(agricultural producer; full-time employed; own business; part-time
employed) or pension.
EKI Dummy
Loan immovable Loan purpose = Purchase immovable assets (land and/or buildings). EKI Dummy
Loan movable Loan purpose = Purchase movable assets (equipment, fixed assets,
vehicles).
EKI Dummy
Loan stock Loan purpose = Purchase of stock (merchandise, raw material,
working capital, agricultural inputs, livestock for reproduction,
seedlings for orchards).
EKI Dummy
Loan household Loan purpose = Private (non-business related) expenses for the
household.
EKI Dummy
Personal collateral Number of personal collateral pledges for each loan (includes
mortgages, administrative bans on the borrower’s salary and pledges
of movable assets).
EKI Discrete
Social collateral Number of social collateral pledges for each loan (includes total and
partial guarantees provided by family and friends of the borrower).
EKI Discrete
Third-party collateral Number of third party collateral pledges for each loan (includes
checks or bills of exchange issued by a guarantor company).
EKI Discrete
Stock index Bosnia Investment Index (May 28th 2002=1). Sarajevo Stock
Exchange
Index
Local GDP Time varying measure of local economic activity as proxied by the
night-light intensity (derived from satellite images) in the locality
where an EKI branch is based. Scale ranges from 0 to 63 where







Loans/officer Monthly number of loans per loan officer. EKI Loans
Branch growth Quarterly growth in total new lending volume (flow) per branch. EKI %
Notes: BAM is Bosnian Convertible Marka. BEPS is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey. MIX:
www.mixmarket.org/.
Table A3. Extensive margin: Robustness and placebo tests







Post is pre Pre is post Random
assignment
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Credit registry*Competition 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.006 0.007 0.000
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
Applicant covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of applications 29,829 96,215 183,066 54,022 79,769 69,427
Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.045 0.046 0.040 0.052 0.041
Notes: Columns [1], [2] and [3] show robustness tests of our main results as reported in Table 2. In columns [1]
we use a shorter time window February 2009-February 2010. In column [2] the window is May 2008-December
2010. In column [3] we use the largest possible window January 2007-December 2012. Columns [4], [5] and [6]
show placebo tests of our main results as reported in Table 2. In columns [4] and [5] we move the two-year window
one year forward and backward, respectively. In column [6], we randomly allocate branches to either high or low
competition status. We repeat this random allocation a thousand times and show the average result. The treat-
ment period starts in July 2009. Credit registry is a dummy variable that is '1' if the credit registry was in place
in a given month, zero otherwise. Competition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition
is above the median level of competition as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where local market shares are
measured in number of branches). Dummies for the introduction of the credit registry and for high competition
are included but not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered by loan officer and appear in parentheses. ***,
**, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix contains
all variable definitions. The same borrower and loan covariates as in Table 2 are included but not shown.
Figure A2. Information sharing, credit market competition: Parallel trends
(a) Loan amount (b) Loan term
(c) Interest rate (d) Total collateral
Notes: Conditional trends over the sample period January 2008-December 2010. Loan terms have been
regressed on client and loan characteristics. The fitted values from these regressions are shown for high
versus low competition areas in the graphs above.
Table A4. Intensive margin: Placebo tests
Dependent variable → Loan amount Loan term
Post is pre Pre is post Random
allocation
Post is pre Pre is post Random
allocation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post CRK*Competition 0.010 -0.046 0.000 -0.007 -0.022 0.000
(0.040) (0.030) (0.000) (0.034) (0.020) (0.000)
Borrower covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local econ. control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of loans 12,627 38,407 28,240 12,626 38,407 28,240
Adjusted R-squared 0.380 0.459 0.007 0.247 0.357 0.006
Dependent variable → Interest rate Collateral
Post is pre Pre is post Random
allocation
Post is pre Pre is post Random
allocation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post CRK*Competition -0.093 0.028 0.000 0.105 0.024 0.000
(0.134) (0.094) (0.000) (0.064) (0.075) (0.001)
Borrower covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local econ. control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of loans 12,626 38,407 28,240 12,627 38,407 28,240
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.255 0.004 0.449 0.414 0.007
Notes: This table shows loan level estimates for weighted least squares models where the dependent variables
are: loan amount, loan term, interest rate and total collateral contracts. In columns [1] and [4] we show results
for a placebo test where we move the two-year window one year forward while in columns [2] and [5] we move the
two-year window one year backward. In columns [3] and [6] we randomise the allocation to high and low com-
petition branches over 1,000 trials. Post CRK is a dummy variable that is '1' if the CRK was in place in a given
month, zero otherwise. Competition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition is above the
median level of competition as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where local market shares are measured
in number of branches). Robust standard errors are clustered by loan officer and appear in parentheses. ***,
**, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix contains
all variable definitions. The same borrower and loan covariates as in Table 4 are included but not shown.
Table A5. Intensive margin: Robustness tests













[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post CRK*Competition -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.101*** -0.063** -0.080*** -0.048***
(0.042) (0.031) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033) (0.019)
Borrower covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local econ. control Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
No. of loans 11,842 33,965 88,623 11,842 33,965 88,623
Adjusted R-squared 0.452 0.447 0.391 0.333 0.340 0.271













[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Post CRK*Competition 0.492*** 0.358*** 0.146 0.223*** 0.236*** 0.237***
(0.123) (0.114) (0.094) (0.064) (0.060) (0.073)
Borrower covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local econ. control Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
No. of loans 11,842 33,965 88,623 11,842 33,965 88,623
Adjusted R-squared 0.231 0.268 0.266 0.451 0.431 0.382
Notes: This table shows robustness tests of our main results as reported in Table 4. In columns [1] and [4]
we use a shorter time window February 2009-February 2010. In columns [2] and [5] the window is May 2008-
December 2010. In columns [3] and [6] we use the widest possible window May 2006-December 2012. Credit
registry is a dummy variable that is '1' if the credit registry was in place in a given month; '0' otherwise. Com-
petition: Dummy variable that is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median level of competition
as measured by 1 minus the HHI index (where local market shares are measured in number of branches). Ro-
bust standard errors are clustered by loan officer and appear in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%,
5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions. The
same borrower and loan covariates as in Table 4 are included but not shown.
Table A6. High vs. low competition areas: Means comparison of socio-
economic characteristics
Low competition areas High competition areas
[1] [2]
Food spending 349.72 388.67
Percentage owns a computer 30.47 61.30**
Percentage bank account 42.99 54.30
Percentage risk takers 60.30 57.31
Percentage employed 28.94 42.59
Percentage orthodox 30.50 28.03
Crisis impact 2.33 2.19
Cantonal unemployment 0.46 0.46
Cantonal GDP 3,189 3,305
Notes: Sample period is June 2002-December 2010. Asterisks refer to p-value of t-test of
equality of means. ** corresponds to the 5% level of significance. Source: EBRD-World
Bank Life in Transition Survey (2010).
Table A7. Information sharing and loan quality: Hazard model extensions and
alternative specifications
Functional form Cox proportional Exponential Weibull
Time structure Time-varying predictors
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Credit registry*competition -0.301** -0.247** -0.268* -0.203** -0.264* -0.200*
(0.153) (0.101) (0.156) (0.102) (0.154) (0.102)
Credit registry -1.332*** -1.230*** -0.789*** -0.732*** -0.922*** -0.856***
(0.115) (0.080) (0.118) (0.083) (0.117) (0.082)
Competition -0.056* -0.102*** -0.049 -0.096*** -0.069** -0.119***
(0.030) (0.022) (0.034) (0.025) (0.033) (0.024)
First loan 0.683*** 0.665*** 0.684***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024)




No. of obs. 356,131 1,119,122 356,131 1,119,122 356,131 1,119,122
Log-likelihood ratio -49,419 -101,919 -20,653 -41,799 -20,115 -40,842
Notes: This table shows the results of (semi-)parametric hazard models. The dependent variable
is the hazard rate: the probability that a loan i is defaulted on in month t given that default did
not occur earlier. A default event occurs when a borrower is at least 30 days late in making a
payment and the loan was eventually written off. The same controls as in Table 6 and a constant
are included but not shown. Sample period: June 2002-December 2010. We restrict the sample
to new customers in columns [1], [3], and [5]. Credit registry is a dummy variable that is '1' if the
credit registry was in place in a given quarter; '0' otherwise. Competition: Dummy variable that
is '1' if local credit market competition is above the median level of competition as measured by
1 minus the HHI index where local market shares are measured in number of branches. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance,
respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
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m
p
et
it
io
n
is
a
b
ov
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
le
v
el
o
f
co
m
p
et
it
io
n
a
s
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
1
m
in
u
s
th
e
H
H
I
in
d
ex
(w
h
er
e
lo
ca
l
m
a
rk
et
sh
a
re
s
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
in
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
ra
n
ch
es
).
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
lo
a
n
o
ffi
ce
r
a
n
d
a
p
p
ea
r
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
*
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
to
th
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
o
f
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
a
b
le
A
2
in
th
e
A
p
p
en
d
ix
co
n
ta
in
s
a
ll
va
ri
a
b
le
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
e
b
o
rr
ow
er
a
n
d
lo
a
n
co
va
ri
a
te
s
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
6
a
re
in
cl
u
d
ed
b
u
t
n
o
t
sh
ow
n
.
